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CHALLENGES FOR THE NOMINAL CONVERGENCE IN POLAND IN THE FACE  
OF THE UNIFORM POLICY OF THE EUROZONE 
 
1. Introduction 
A common European Union currency has been in 
retail use for slightly more than a decade now. Nonethe-
less, this short period of usage is enough to conduct var-
ious theoretical and empirical analyses of the single-cur-
rency area in Europe.  
The theoretical aspect of the research on the Euro-
zone should also focus on the issues of quality of the 
pre-accession policy. In this context, the manner of de-
termining the monetary and fiscal policy prior to access-
ing a monetary union becomes of considerable im-
portance. The level of convergence of fundamental pa-
rameters of these policies (in particular their interest 
rates, inflation, budget deficit) constitutes a key factor 
conditioning the efficacy of the process of monetary in-
tegration itself. Another problem is the possibility to di-
verge economic indexes in the countries which already 
belong to the monetary union. A good example is as-
sessing the efficiency of monetary impulses generated 
by a supranational central bank. Different features of 
monetary policies of particular member states, espe-
cially those concerning the state of liquidity of the com-
mercial banking sector and the mechanism of financial 
allocation, may distort the character of the mechanism 
of monetary transmission, leading as a result to diver-
gence in the level of interest rates and/or inflation. A key 
role in shaping the monetary sphere within the area in 
question shall thus be attributed to the scope of reputa-
tion of the supranational central bank.  
The above deliberation gives background to the 
main aim of this work which is the presentation of the 
theoretical aspects of the process of convergence in the 
monetary sphere in the pre- and post-accession period as 
well as the assessment of the level of Poland’s conver-
gence with the Eurozone in the context of the uniform 
policy of the European Central Bank. 
 
2. Variants of pre-accession monetary and fiscal 
policy  
The stability of the Eurozone is considered both 
through the prism of the conditions which should appear 
in the course of its functioning and the conditions for-
mulated in the pre-accession period. Of particular im-
portance in this period is the shape of the monetary pol-
icy which has an influence on two main parameters of 
the monetary sphere, i.e. the inflation rate and the inter-
est rate. It is assumed that Poland’s accession to the Eu-
rozone will take place in a few years’ time, e.g. in the 
period t + n, where t constitutes the present time (figure 
1). It means that in order to fulfil the convergence crite-
ria in the monetary sphere (as well as the fiscal and for-
eign exchange spheres), adequate adaptations must take 
place within n years. In this respect, we may specify two 
extreme variants. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Time periods on the way to the Eurozone 
Source: the authors’ self-analysis. 
 
Variant I would consist in fulfilling the monetary 
criteria, especially inflation, even prior to joining ERM 
II. Variant II would consist in not achieving monetary 
borderline values before the exchange rate between the 
Polish zloty and euro has been fixed. It is assumed that 
not achieving the borderline values means a lack of any 
adaptations in the monetary sphere [Błaszczyk, 
Zwierzchlewski 2008]. 
The effects of the monetary authorities’ actions re-
quired to lower inflation in variant I could be less harm-
ful to the real sphere of the economy if they were spread 
in time for the period (t, t + m). The National Bank of 
Poland (NBP) could reduce the inflation by shaping in-
flation expectations properly, thus avoiding an exces-
sive growth in the interest rate. It has to be highlighted, 
however, that strict requirements for fulfilling the infla- 
Eurozone ERM II
t t + m + 1t + m t + n
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tion criterion may persist in the future. In such a case, 
the monetary authorities will have to take more restric-
tive measures resulting in a slowdown in the real GDP 
growth and its consequences for the employment 
sphere. On the other hand, these hardships may be less 
harmful since they are spread in time. It seems, however, 
rather unlikely to attain the economic results making it 
possible to join the Eurozone in a painless way, espe-
cially for such countries as Poland, where the unemploy-
ment rate is relatively high.  
A positive consequence of realising variant I may 
also be great stability of the Polish zloty in the European 
trading band. It results from a smaller scale of adapta-
tions of monetary instruments in the period (t + m, t + n) 
due to their active adaptation in the period (t, t + m). 
Thus, the interchangeability between the inflation and 
nominal appreciation would be split in time, making it 
possible to reduce the inflation prior to joining ERM II 
and to ensure a stable exchange rate of the Polish zloty 
to the euro with a fluctuation band of ±15%. It shall be 
highlighted that there exists a method in variant I in 
which the exchange rate of the zloty may be changed. 
This method consists in the possibility to negotiate the 
level of the parity rate while joining ERM II. It results 
from the fact that the central parity does not have to be 
settled at the level which is equal to the current nominal 
rate existing at the time of currency stabilisation. One 
consequence of realising variant I would be a stronger 
negotiation position of Poland following, first of all, 
overestimation of the exchange rate of the zloty, differ-
ing considerably from the level of a long-term balance 
rate resulting from earlier actions in the monetary and 
fiscal spheres, and secondly, a negative influence of an 
excessively strong currency on the unemployment rate 
in Poland.  
Variant II assumes failure to fulfil the convergence 
criteria prior to bringing the zloty to ERM II. Conse-
quently, there will be a necessity to fulfil these criteria 
in the first year of membership in the currency mecha-
nism (t + m, t + m + 1). This necessity results from the 
divergence between a two-year reference period in the 
currency rate sphere and a one-year reference period for 
the other criteria. The application of variant II would en-
tail a severe fiscal and monetary restriction accumulated 
in time. An unquestionable effect of such actions would 
be a shock in the real sphere of the economy. Possible 
economic actions within the variant under discussion 
would also entail some destabilising effects for the ex-
change rate of the zloty in ERM II. The scale of desta-
bilisation would depend on how severe the Balassa-
Samuelson effect would turn out to be and on the scale 
of the speculative capital flow. With a large strength of 
both of the criteria, simultaneous reduction in the infla-
tion and control of the currency exchange rate (within 
the band of ±15%) would be very difficult to reconcile. 
It seems, however, that practical realisation of variant II 
                                                        
1 A monetary order in more general terms also refers to the type of monetary signs and principles of financial settlements 
used in a given country [Narolewska 2001; Jurek, Knakiewicz, Marszałek 2011].  
is rather unlikely to happen, especially in the face of a 
large internal imbalance in the Polish economy.  
 
3. Selected problems of uniform monetary pol-
icy in the Eurozone  
Stability of the Eurozone requires convergent mon-
etary order with convergent inflation and interest rates. 
The monetary order specifies the bases for the function-
ing of a central bank, including above all the available 
instruments, priorities in conducting the monetary pol-
icy and its institutional framework1. This creates funda-
mental elements of the order in question in the form of 
the level of the interest rate, the level of the inflation and 
the manner in which these variables are determined in-
cluding the scope of political independence and eco-
nomic responsibility of the central bank. 
Divergence of the monetary sphere components 
may lead to the occurrence of negative economic phe-
nomena threatening the stability of the single-currency 
area. For instance, in countries with lower inflation com-
mon monetary policy would become overly restrictive 
(due to a high real rate), having a negative effect on the 
level of employment and the domestic product, whereas 
in the countries where inflation is higher it would be too 
expansive (due to a low real rate), which would be con-
ducive to a further increase – rather than decrease – in 
inflation. Thus, on the one hand the situation on the la-
bour market would worsen, yet on the other hand, infla-
tion tendencies, including inflation expectations, would 
strengthen [Błaszczyk 2010, p. 56]. Assuming a uniform 
inflation rate, divergent values of the market interest 
rates would divide the level of real rates, which would 
curb economic development or hinder maintaining the 
same level of inflation in the Eurozone member states. 
In economic reality there may, however, occur dif-
ferentiation of the levels of inflation and interest rates in 
particular member states of the Eurozone despite the fact 
that the monetary instruments which influence the val-
ues of the above variables are specified in a centralised 
system. A factor which influences the (different) level 
of interest rates is the character of the mechanism for 
transmitting the monetary policy. Of particular im-
portance here is the aspect of an external delay of this 
policy. In most general terms, it may be described as the 
time that the economy needs to adapt itself to new con-
ditions created by the change in the economic instru-
ments [Kowalski 2001, p. 81]. The character of the de-
lay in question is determined by the institutional frame-
work specified in a given country within the scope of 
commercial banks, including the character of relations 
between these banks and a central bank and between pri-
vate banks and the real economy. This character may 
differentiate the monetary sphere in member states, 
since it was previously (prior to accession) determined 
by individual practice of relations between national cen-
tral banks and the sector of financial mediation as well 
as between this sector and households and enterprises. 
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If the relations between these links were different in re-
ality, it would be difficult to make them uniform after 
the accession to the Eurozone of particular states, at least 
in a short-term perspective [Dornbusch, Favero, 
Giavazzi 1998]. That is why different levels of the li-
quidity of banking sectors or different characters of the 
mechanism of financial allocation1 in these countries 
may create divergent reactions of private banks to the 
transmission of monetary impulses from a common cen-
tral bank and the real sphere of the economy to the 
changes in the market rates in the banking sector.  
Specifying the types of inflation constitutes the ba-
sis for establishing the causes of the possible differenti-
ation of its levels in the Eurozone. For example, an in-
terest rate is an important determinant of demand, since 
it creates the size of a bank loan. That is why the above-
mentioned factors which differentiate the level of inter-
est rates have an influence also on the levels of inflation 
in particular member states. What has to be taken into 
account at this point is a growing influence of the so-
called credit intermediaries which are usually not sub-
ject to supervision by the monetary authorities. These 
entities may increase the credit expansion in the periods 
of restrictive monetary policy, and thus distort the trans-
mission of the policy of a common central bank [Du-
wendag et al. 1996, p. 160]. This problem becomes even 
larger (due to the differences in the levels of inflation) 
when there is uneven concentration of these entities 
among the monetary union member states. 
With the existence of the factors which may distort 
the monetary order in the Eurozone, of particular im-
portance becomes the issue of the reputation of a supra-
national central bank, and thus the quality of the com-
mon monetary policy. The main problem is the fact that 
the credibility of a central bank cannot be built over-
night. However, this process may be efficiently short-
ened by applying adequate institutional solutions with 
respect to central banking in the Eurozone. The compo-
nents of these solutions are the following: 
building a common central bank in accordance 
with a specific adopted model,  
specifying an explicite goal (or goals) of the com-
mon monetary policy, 
granting the bank in question complete political 
and functional independence and minimising its formal 
responsibility for realising its own goals, 
determining an explicite manner of specifying an 
interest rate and exchange regulations. 
Assuming in advance a certain point of reference 
for the form of a common bank may cause the economic 
and private entities to accept and place confidence in the 
new monetary authorities without much hesitation. A 
necessary condition for this is relatively early infor-
mation concerning the assumed model and its prestige. 
That is why a commonly accepted central bank must  
 
                                                        
1 The condition of the liquidity of the banking sector is one of the factors which influence the time and strength of reactions 
of commercial banks to a change in the values of the instruments of a central bank, whereas the mechanism of financial allocation 
determines to a large extent the time and strength of reactions of enterprises to a change in market interest rates. 
serve as a point of reference. The determinants of the 
bank’s good reputation should be the following: high ef-
ficiency in realising goals and clear rules of communi-
cation with the environment. It also seems favourable to 
choose such a bank model from the  group of states 
which make up the monetary union.  
Economic benefits coming from low inflation and 
the necessity to maintain the inflation at a similar level 
among the Eurozone member states should be a final de-
terminant for selecting a superior goal of the common 
monetary policy of the union in the form of a stable price 
level. Assuming a principle that the goal of this policy 
will be to attain more than one aim, e.g. low inflation, 
high employment rate or high financial stability within 
the monetary union, forces economic and private enti-
ties to settle which aim shall become more important (in 
the short- and long-term periods). This may result in 
considerable decline in confidence to a common central 
bank from the viewpoint of price stability and distort the 
monetary order in the union. 
The conditions in which the monetary authorities 
are created in the Eurozone should also serve as a deter-
minant for granting a full scope of political and func-
tional independence to these authorities. The manners of 
functioning of the authorities in question may be deter-
mined in the course of international arrangements or in 
the course of such arrangements together with the aid of 
an independent organ of the union consisting of a group 
of experts [De Cecco, Giovannini, CUP, Cambridge 
1989], above all in the area of central banking. It is dif-
ficult to determine the entity on which a common central 
bank would be (more or less) politically dependent and 
obliged to account for the effects of its actions. Such an 
entity could not definitely be any of the national param-
eters due to the negative political connotations of choos-
ing such a solution. Any scope of dependence on and 
responsibility to an organ of the union would require 
granting it broad prerogatives in order to exercise power 
within the area of the Eurozone. In reality, this would 
entail the presence of a political and currency union 
characterised both by complete integration of the mone-
tary sphere and the existence of the supranational legis-
lative and executive authorities. Such a high level of po-
liticising is, however, a feature of higher forms of inte-
gration with reference to the monetary union. Similar 
reasons justify equipping a common central bank with 
unlimited competences concerning the establishment of 
the levels of interest rates and other instruments of the 
monetary policy. A logical reason for granting full func-
tional independence is also the structure of goals of the 
common monetary policy, including above all the reali-
sation of the superior goal [Bofinger 2001]. 
Specifying by a common central bank a uniform 
range of monetary instruments for all member states of 
the union creates a problem of choosing its most optimal  
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shape. Of particular importance is the choice of the best 
possible interest rate in the case when there occur diffe- 
rences in the levels of inflation in particular Eurozone 
member states. The credibility of the bank in question 
will depend on how precisely it will be able to explain 
to the society the method of selecting the level of the 
interest rate. In order to strengthen this credibility, the 
interest rate level should be placed in the middle of the 
interest rate range desired by particular states. Most 
states would then be eager to accept the current level of 
the interest rate in relation to the inflation rate. In this 
context an important element of constructing the institu-
tional framework for a common central bank is its or-
ganisational structure, and especially the shape of the 
process of implementing decisions. An optimal solution 
would be a centralised structure which would accumu-
late this process in the hands of one decision-making 
group that would be autonomic in relations to particular 
member states of the union. In a centralised system it is 
much easier to determine a certain value of the interest 
rate with a different arrangement of inflation levels 
within the Eurozone area. It shall be assumed, however, 
that the national monetary authorities will want to obtain 
a considerable influence on the policy of the common 
central bank. If the decision-making process is decen-
tralised in this bank and national interests begin to dom-
inate the interests of the entire system, it will be quite 
difficult to reach a consensus concerning the level of the 
interest rate with a symmetrical and asymmetrical ar-
rangement of the inflation rate.   
The main determinant of currency relations in a 
monetary union is a lack of the possibility to correct the 
nominal currency rate. A rational assumption may be 
made at the same time that the international exchange 
between particular member states constitutes the main 
part of their foreign trade. In such a situation, develop-
ing competitiveness of each of the economies in the un-
ion requires reducing the costs of production, and con-
sequently reducing the inflation rate. It should result in 
a growth in competitiveness of the entire integration 
group in relation to third countries and constitute at the 
same time an important factor increasing confidence in 
the common currency. Furthermore, this is also a reason 
for focusing on stabilising the financial sphere within 
the monetary union, and not on maintaining a stable rate 
of the common currency in relation to a selected refer-
ence currency. 
 
4. Assessment of nominal convergence in Poland 
in the face of the Maastricht convergence criteria 
The main threat of and fear for joining the Euro-
zone is the loss of the autonomic, national monetary  
policy and the possibility of a discretional influence of 
this instrument on the economy. In order to neutralise 
this negative aspect of accession, it is necessary to ade-
quately conduct convergence, both nominal and real, as 
well as monetary, fiscal and foreign exchange. It may 
cause a uniform policy of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), both in the sphere of goals (with price stability 
being a superior goal) and instruments (the main instru- 
ment being a short-term interest rate) to be adequate for 
Poland and to be conducive to the economic growth. In 
such a case, it seems beneficial to conduct regular as- 
sessment of convergence, including the nominal conver-
gence, with the Eurozone. 
The assessment in this work concerns the Maas-
tricht criteria of the nominal convergence. These criteria 
should be viewed not only from the prism of the neces-
sity of their fulfilment in order to join the Eurozone 
(possibly in a quick and unstable manner), but also as 
the areas where the convergence with the monetary un-
ion shall ensure benefits to the member states. Of the 
main interest is the criterion concerning the general 
price level dynamics, since it is the value (and more pre-
cisely price stability) which determines a strategic and 
superior goal not only of the ECB but also the majority 
of central banks around the world, including the NBP. 
The other convergence criteria may be viewed from the 
prism of the conditions of the monetary policy which in-
fluence the price dynamics. Thus, their convergence has 
an influence on the efficacy of this policy.  
On the one hand, fiscal parameters (the deficit and 
the public finance sector debt) are positively correlated 
with the price dynamics. For instance, overly expansive 
fiscal policy, much as it causes an increase in the param-
eters, influences in the same direction the inflation and 
distorts its stability. An unstable currency rate also dis-
torts the price stability. In this case, the interrelations are 
also positive – a growth in the rate (assuming it is depre-
ciation – direct quotation) stimulates the inflation. Re-
versed relations occur, on the other hand, in the case of 
the interest rate influencing the price dynamics. The 
above-presented relations indicate the necessity to coor-
dinate various areas of the economic policy (monetary, 
fiscal and if need be – treating it separately – foreign 
exchange). Only this policy can ensure long-lasting ful-
filment of the Maastricht criteria and increase in the 
long-term the benefits of joining the area of a common 
European currency. The results of this part of the re-
search will indicate among all, firstly, which of the cri-
teria constitute the main barrier for Poland’s accession 
to the Eurozone, and secondly, in which years Poland 
was “closest” to the Eurozone. 
In order to conduct the assessment of convergence 
in such a depiction, a few assumptions have been made. 
First of all, the examination encompasses the period be-
tween 2004 and 2014. The initial turning point is Po-
land’s accession to the EU, which gives the possibility 
to apply for joining the Eurozone, whereas the final 
point is determined by the availability of the data, espe-
cially bearing in mind next assumptions. Secondly, the 
assessment encompasses five convergence criteria laid 
down in the Treaty of Maastricht. Thirdly, the assess-
ment is conducted at the end of particular years. 
Fourthly, the assessment uses the Eurostat data taken 
from its webpage in September 2015. Next, the authors 
have made an assumption concerning convergence with 
respect to price stability that the states which are char-
acterised by the negative general price level dynamics 
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cannot play reference roles 1. Finally, the examination 
omits the assessment concerning the foreign exchange 
criterion. 
The assessment of Poland’s convergence in this 
area seems difficult due to a lack of specified central 
parity for the ERM II system. It shall be highlighted, 
however, that the exchange rate is a macroeconomic 
value which cannot be controlled precisely, especially 
under the conditions of the independent floating system. 
The changes in the system are influenced also by the 
factors which do not depend on the national economic 
authorities and which are frequently unpredictable, e.g. 
a financial and economic crisis. Additionally, is shall be 
emphasised that currency tensions may occur in the fu-
ture as a result of the activities within the economic pol-
icy aiming at fulfilling the other Maastricht criteria. In 
particular, a strong connection with the general price 
level dynamics through the main factor shaping both 
values, i.e. the interest rate, should be noticed. With the 
above circumstances, the criterion in question should 
not be underestimated by the economic authorities. 
Comprehensive results of the assessment in the remain-
ing four areas are presented in figure 2 and in table 1. 
 
Deficit Debt 
 
 
Inflation Interest rates 
 
Fig. 2. Nominal convergence criteria in Poland in the period 2004-2014 
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the Eurostat data. 
 
Analysing the table horizontally, one may con-
clude that the worst assessment goes to the criterion of 
the public finance sector deficit. In fact, it constitutes the 
greatest barrier for Poland’s accession to the Eurozone. 
The borderline value was not exceeded only in 2007. 
From that year on, the deficit in relation to the GDP had 
grown over the next three years and exceeded consider-
ably the allowable 3% (in the years 2009 and 2010 the 
index in question amounted to 7.3% and 7.9% respec- 
tively). Only in the year 2011 was there a decline in the 
relation under analysis to 5%, and in the years 2012-
2014 a decline to the value between 3 and 4%. Fulfilling 
the reference criterion in this respect will be extremely 
difficult in the following years and will require strict 
policy from the fiscal authorities, especially in the face 
of post-election political disturbances which took place 
at the end of 2015. It seems to be the main challenge for 
Poland on its way to the Eurozone. 
 
                                                        
1 It shall be noted that in 2004 the European Commission decided to eliminate Lithuania from the reference states in their 
reports on convergence, since this country was then characterised by negative HICP dynamics. Yet in 2010, when a few EU 
member states were undergoing deflation (Ireland, Portugal, Estonia, Belgium, Spain), the European Commission decided ar-
bitrarily to eliminate only Ireland from the reference states, since it had the greatest deflation rate. 
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Table 1 
Nominal convergence criteria in Poland in the period 2004-2014 - summary 
                               Year
Criterion 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Debt + + + + + + + + + + +
Deficit - - - + - - - - - - -
Inflation - + + + - - - - - + +
Interest rates - + + + + - - + + + +
Remark: the sign “+” in a particular cell means that a given criterion would be fulfilled in a given year, whereas the 
sing “–” means failure to fulfil the criterion.  
 
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the Eurostat data.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that despite 
positive assessment of the second (fiscal) criterion con-
cerning the relation of the public debt to the GDP, it has 
been characterised by an ascending tendency since 
2007. In 2011 it amounted to 56.4%, and in 2012 to 
55.6%, i.e. the highest value in 15 years, which – ac-
cording to the act on public finance – requires adequate 
precautionary and reformatory procedures to be applied 
[Act of 27 August 2009 on public finance, Article 86, 
87]. In the following years its value stabilised, and even 
decreased a little. However, if there appears a growing 
tendency in the next few years as far as this index is con-
cerned, e.g. in the face of after-election irrational fiscal 
policy, and especially a lack of reforms within public 
finance, there may occur problems with fulfilling the 
reference value in this area in the future. Additionally, 
such a direction of budget policy may be a long-lasting 
stimulus increasing the price dynamics, and conse-
quently posing a threat to the common uniform mone-
tary policy.  
Crucial problems may also concern price stability 
itself, which generally is an effect of the relative charac-
ter of this criterion [Błaszczyk, Zwierzchlewski 2005, 
pp. 17–18]. What follows from the assessment is that 
only in the years 2005-2007 would Poland fulfil the bor-
derline values in this area. Bearing in mind quite a low 
value of this criterion (especially in 2009) on the one 
hand, and the fact that Poland – being a developing 
country – must accept slightly higher price dynamics on 
the other hand, it may be concluded that fulfilling the 
criterion in question (in the period prior to and following 
the accession to the Eurozone) may be troublesome. 
First of all, it will depend on external factors (which do 
not have a source in an interested country) such as price 
dynamics in reference countries as well as an arbitrary 
decision of the EC concerning the manner of estimating 
the borderline values (in the case of deflation). Sec-
ondly, fulfilling a low inflation criterion may require re-
strictive economic policy (mainly monetary), which 
may lead to negative consequences for the real sphere of 
the economy and higher costs of accession. The inflation 
criterion was either fulfilled or not fulfilled on alternate 
years. Similar remarks may be made with reference to 
the criterion concerning the interest rates.   
Analysing figure 2 and table 1 vertically, we may 
conclude that the highest level of nominal convergence 
was achieved by Poland in 2007, when all criteria (ex-
cept for the exchange rate which was not taken into con- 
sideration here) would be fulfilled. In the remaining 
years the criteria would not be fulfilled completely, 
which depicts the degree of convergence of the Polish 
economy with the Eurozone in a negative way. In the 
last two years there was certain noticeable progress. The 
only criterion which was not fulfilled was the budget 
deficit criterion, while the “distance” to its fulfilment 
was shortened by the economic authorities. It shall be 
highlighted that the process of convergence has a long-
term character and only its durability may lead to the 
adaptation to common and uniform monetary policy, 
and thus bring the essential benefits of joining the mon-
etary union. A reflection of this durability is the criterion 
of the long-term interest rate, which – interestingly – ap-
pears rather positive for Poland compared to the other 
criteria. These conclusions should, however, be treated 
with some caution due to the arbitrary assumptions 
made in the assessment as well as for the fact that Poland 
does not officially make any attempts to fulfil the crite-
ria, and especially for the fact that it has not joined ERM 
II yet.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The examination conducted in this work indicate 
explicitly that the convergence of Poland with the Euro-
zone is low in the context of joining common and uni-
form monetary policy. The economy of Poland fails to 
fulfil the criteria conditioning the accession to the Euro-
pean monetary union, and it seems unlikely to change 
due to the fact that Poland lacks broadly understood con-
vergence. There are some serious arguments indicating 
that the uniform policy of the ECB could not be adapted 
to Poland’s economic conditions both in the nominal 
sphere as well as the real, monetary and fiscal spheres. 
In the light of the above conclusions, Poland’s ac-
cession to the Eurozone should be planned and con- 
ducted in a proper way, including an adequate time hori-
zon and the character of social and economic conditions. 
It should match the process of broadly understood long-
term convergence of the developing Polish economy. 
Only such a manner of accession may guarantee an ac-
tive balance of benefits and costs of joining the Euro-
zone. The date of accessing the Eurozone should, first 
of all, be a secondary issue depending on the entire pro-
cess of convergence, and secondly, it should be finally 
determined for the most favourable period in terms of 
the local and global financial and economic conditions. 
It should not certainly take place in the time of a crisis. 
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As has been shown in this work, the convergence of the 
Polish economy with the Eurozone in such circum-
stances was exceptionally low, especially in terms of the 
general price level dynamics. Additionally, what should 
also be taken into consideration is the uncertainty asso-
ciated with the after-election transitional period. Its pos-
sibilities to stabilise will determine the perspectives for 
the nominal convergence in Poland and its accession to 
the Eurozone. 
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Блашчик П., Звєжхлевський С. Проблеми 
номінальної конвергенції в Польщі в контексті 
єдиної політики Єврозони 
Основна мета даного дослідження полягає в по-
данні теоретичних аспектів процесу конвергенції в 
області грошово-кредитної системи під час, до і пі-
сля вступу Польщі до ЄС, а також оцінки ступеня 
польської конвергенції по відношенню до Єврозони 
в контексті єдиної політики Європейського центра-
льного банку. Робота складається з двох основних 
частин: теоретичної та емпіричної. У першій частині 
представлено аналіз варіантів грошово-кредитної 
політики протягом періоду підготовки приєднання 
до зони євро і європейських дилем грошово-кредит-
ної політики. У другій частині, на підставі дослі-
джень представлених в першій частині, міститься 
оцінка польської інтеграції з Єврозоною в контексті 
єдиної політики Європейського центрального бан-
ку. 
Ключові слова: номінальна конвергенція в 
Польщі, єдина політика, Єврозона. 
 
Блашчик П., Звежхлевский С. Проблемы но-
минальной конвергенции в Польше в контексте 
единой политики Еврозоны 
Основная цель данного исследования заключа-
ется в представлении теоретических аспектов про-
цесса конвергенции в области денежно-кредитной 
системы во время, до и после вступления Польши в 
ЕС, а также оценки степени польской конвергенции 
по отношению к Еврозоне в контексте единой поли-
тики Европейского центрального банка. Работа со-
стоит из двух основных частей: теоретической и эм-
пирической. В первой части представлен анализ ва-
риантов денежно-кредитной политики в течение пе-
риода подготовки присоединения к зоне евро и ев-
ропейских дилемм денежно-кредитной политики. 
Во второй части, на основании исследований пред-
ставленных в первой части, содержится оценка 
польской интеграции с Еврозоной в контексте еди-
ной политики Европейского центрального банка. 
Ключевые слова: номинальная конвергенция в 
Польше, единая политика, Еврозона. 
 
Blashchyk P., Zvershchlevsky S. Challenges for 
the Nominal Convergence in Poland in the Face of 
the Uniform Policy of the Eurozone 
The main objective of this study is to present the 
theoretical aspects of the convergence process in the 
field of monetary affairs during the pre- and after-acces-
sion period and evaluation of the degree of convergence 
of the Polish with the euro area in the context of a single 
policy of the European Central Bank. The paper consists 
of two basic parts: the theoretical and the empirical. In 
the first were presented a reflection on variants of mon-
etary policy during the pre-accession period to the euro 
area and the European monetary policy dilemmas. In the 
second part, against this background, contains an assess-
ment of the Polish convergence with the euro area in the 
context of a single policy of the European Central Bank. 
Keywords: nominal convergence in Poland, uni-
form policy, Eurozone. 
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